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Abstract 
This paper explores the current evidence underlying the debate on aid effectiveness, 
with a specific focus on the health sector. It summarizes the history of aid and outlines 
the methodological challenges encountered when assessing its effectiveness. The 
current evidence on ‘what works’ in the different aid modalities is outlined, highlighting 
examples of success. The review finds that resource allocation, lack of predictability of 
funds, fragmentation, fungibility and the system of relationships foreign aid generates 
all hinder its effectiveness. Furthermore, even when projects are successful, countries 
face constraints in scaling them up. The aid effectiveness debate is dynamic, however, 
and constantly influenced by new global policies and players. The paper ends with a 
discussion of the future of aid and how these new actors and policies are likely to shape 
the landscape of development co-operation. 
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1 Introduction 
There has been a long history of high-income countries providing development 
assistance to low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), most pledging to devote 0.7 
per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) for this purpose (Clemens and Moss 
2005). Although most countries have not met their target, the amount of development 
assistance has risen exponentially over the past ten years. This, together with worries 
about the sustainability of increases in funding given the current economic climate, has 
resulted in widespread interest on the impact of development assistance, with a growing 
literature seeking to assess whether it has had any impact on growth and social 
development. As we shall see below, this literature shows mixed results, hindered by 
methodological difficulties and lack of data. The aim of this paper is to examine the 
current evidence regarding the effectiveness of aid in the health sector in order to shed 
some light on what the current state of knowledge is, and how the future of the aid 
effectiveness debate looks. 
 
The history of development assistance has taken many turns, with infrastructure and 
‘hard’ sectors being favoured in the earlier decades, and ‘softer’ social sectors preferred 
in the first decade of this century. The health sector has received particularly generous 
funding, having quintupled from US$5.82 billion in 1990 to US$27.73 billion in 2011 
(Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2011).The amount of development 
assistance for health (DAH) roughly remained at the 1995 level until 2000—the new 
millennium saw a surge in DAH. Secular upward trends occurred from 2002 to today 
(OECD-DAC data). The prominence of recognition of HIV/AIDS as a global problem 
resulted in a proportion of DAH going to HIV/AIDS, rising from being around 10 per 
cent of total amount DAH in 2000 to nearly 40 per cent by 2007 (see Figure 3). Table 1 
shows historical trends in DAH from the early 1970s until the present day.  
 
This increase in funds has been accompanied by a proliferation of actors who provide 
(governments, private foundations, individuals and the corporate sector), manage (bi-
lateral agencies, inter-governmental agencies, global health partnerships, non-
government organizations (NGOs), private foundations) or spend (DAH (multi-lateral 
agencies, the UN, global health partnerships, NGOs, private sector, and low- and 
middle-income governments and civil society organizations) (McCoy et al. 2009). This 
wide variety of actors deliver development assistance for health using different funding 
modalities, depending on the amount of earmarking they require and the extent to which 
they rely on government systems for planning, disbursement and monitoring of funds. 
These include project, programme aid, sector wide approaches and budget support, with 
projects having the most earmarking and budget support the least (Foster and Leavy 
2001). See Section 2 for a discussion of aid modalities. 
 
Concerns about the efficacy and effectiveness of development assistance are not new 
and have resulted in several international declarations endorsing ‘good practice’ 
principles aimed at improving aid effectiveness, including the Monterrey Consensus on 
Financing for Development in 2002, the Rome Declaration on Harmonization in 2003 
and the Joint Marrakech Memorandum on Managing for Results. 
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Table 1: Development assistance for health flows (2009 constant US$ millions) 
Year Africa (non-
specified) 
America (non-
specified) 
Asia (non-
specified) 
Europe Far East Asia Middle East North & 
Central 
America 
North of 
Sahara 
Oceania South & Central 
Asia 
South America South of Sahara Unspecified Grand Total 
1973    19.49618124 99.09566662  0.224883675 86.45212557 7.31569032 19.27003169 212.8359661 157.1627558  601.853301 
1974     88.82041736 0.218576842 94.21013857 6.833660202 11.58165584 67.76448141 85.1858849 232.3985212  587.0133364 
1975     22.16357456 5.820907485 139.7931362  11.28823437 244.7256012 23.66324801 113.2291298 0.334288516 561.0181201 
1976 0.185255234   0.797308746 82.94963823 1.46886642 272.6727707 45.28607588 17.09836561 65.56233124 67.40752577 127.7409597  681.1690975 
1977    1.683612553 56.34726082 28.24052027 32.50201807 19.46373256 13.41630898 190.4349687 13.91713511 165.8500812  521.8556382 
1978 0.64424937 2.407134489   304.9456878 9.619513637 106.8552672 70.69806449 14.05097418 166.6985811 117.3475973 172.9945688  966.2616383 
1979    0.656009348 282.1369811 1.043703107 13.11640587 26.3156607 2.303883385 195.6303932 77.46865771 160.8694557  759.5411501 
1980    0.220564825 215.0893301 5.96849822 130.8539787 129.5146723 1.133146624 418.8830741 65.0447117 170.4085443 0.831600417 1137.948121 
1981 23.72775573 0.561410674 3.274241392  343.8508778 1.643417314 190.9883859 178.3422077 4.186935329 389.7997009 92.49871885 337.5526393 21.61191989 1588.038211 
1982 36.70946899 1.016795121 1.972266023  295.4943745 33.45537484 149.9040715 92.35166283 2.143727253 275.4197726 166.534109 517.537324 9.907532937 1582.44648 
1983 43.40458006 1.672416269 5.848357826 0.146689821 194.3253649 49.09825335 88.03043469 90.24167459 8.665171139 367.5543838 100.9937196 455.3169493 25.63260323 1430.930598 
1984 38.30078099 0.341132947 10.4192989  369.7263166 70.06226917 93.04281003 25.40165552 12.46461285 613.1957146 135.8226601 383.6588151 31.12587668 1783.561943 
1985 49.57091594 5.153573279 11.51282964  262.9445092 38.43715391 243.4221234 99.96144241 60.54215798 501.0997819 96.62394804 538.6044055 19.13791908 1927.01076 
1986 45.61528242 19.74073163 16.43205202  150.028725 27.26953315 198.5645749 77.42756903 25.36959723 661.0881285 40.90386525 560.6046753 36.38635574 1859.43109 
1987 86.25503584 5.131764224 9.130717893 12.70385789 253.7941038 26.28985006 266.6659099 84.85236219 14.57758588 450.9709619 69.96222605 699.6512452 45.28452494 2025.270146 
1988 151.0943332 25.72323125 6.610118796 3.474178205 185.0122078 19.47655811 182.433026 189.7367565 20.81628327 467.192683 155.5220581 1018.128238 131.3011133 2556.520786 
1989 118.1543848 11.22204105  0.175825347 236.477793 23.8114055 204.7960558 78.04519964 32.50218388 533.3964754 112.5014853 921.1126746 114.0111471 2386.206671 
1990 61.05424184 6.900219148 5.760949909  318.6135082 17.84398583 180.7909335 31.85183698 37.21699946 775.1818979 130.0766592 887.208564 29.49459915 2481.994395 
1991 116.1217346 2.864988749 7.468618557 0.691127457 317.9888423 64.10963183 192.4856672 74.53718663 75.4050643 681.0682667 175.0132787 1128.498768 63.52189442 2899.775069 
1992 41.98112471 2.491130521 6.567949316 33.47311336 117.6393361 21.91256822 177.6068949 122.6479086 49.14549442 1109.875167 181.0898923 1176.568002 142.696812 3183.695393 
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1993 26.47668252  4.189576967 2.10677583 658.2643838 87.57190556 297.89413 148.9527058 44.30314551 552.0848201 199.9856795 1166.24185 253.0334743 3441.105129 
1994 69.88280702 0.021327116 3.457786711 31.33195046 385.8234545 50.19230698 141.4072371 115.7409639 34.74439055 1029.741309 137.9220842 1088.202962 740.2835278 3828.752107 
1995 39.70945512 2.347773389 1.076049237 40.21565817 446.9439108 80.54901454 238.8550051 130.1487862 8.391671703 406.932973 300.065659 1381.407387 845.0651599 3921.708503 
1996 47.01138919 3.878246699 2.377169733 45.32448539 728.3707097 83.52769031 249.8788306 79.47585121 82.99346758 1162.385648 123.9831447 1174.461465 467.9699887 4251.638087 
1997 94.10113241 41.94251181 54.23891852 55.28475789 329.7822297 54.89582616 279.8529643 59.83357953 55.81654336 1446.655852 255.1929963 1272.530341 567.6754737 4567.803126 
1998 51.30337345 16.46345326 19.39075532 64.99931609 469.5838767 89.34071089 433.5516426 455.3025303 76.01717453 1561.667063 211.0861327 1622.407016 586.2108839 5657.323928 
1999 91.36473544 13.97389845 30.21191096 129.5222975 571.3185059 97.21006292 332.88719 152.9182551 147.2913747 832.2528149 313.6423953 1734.016945 614.2476208 5060.858007 
2000 122.2966317 21.8745737 29.56580329 228.2127936 570.3159148 145.1818712 214.0607453 202.8628406 205.909608 1314.157179 198.648662 2707.311943 596.4864843 6556.88505 
2001 78.35436128 38.55702649 34.92323908 82.42543579 713.7963168 115.8466706 267.0792706 114.2183161 101.1764853 792.2695059 251.3471443 2881.298785 930.2545101 6401.547067 
2002 73.00076346 28.75589583 68.58262614 112.7643773 818.5022685 249.643004 424.8545476 106.4480679 137.0596077 1025.274809 247.6124065 3147.858946 1508.263458 7948.620779 
2003 125.7008984 16.60087488 36.9511949 186.7975106 982.366066 228.9164228 370.2401227 98.84183708 125.2296951 1397.21378 357.9395983 4041.083241 1776.675985 9744.557227 
2004 803.0569352 522.0791525 336.3560142 4633.411447 11945.3586 13566.48616 4898.820409 4281.15107 1452.810176 17891.25914 4685.382864 34888.09703 15113.81615 115018.0851 
2005 583.4397282 525.9642569 881.7921555 6627.64663 14399.36678 25924.44902 5587.403291 3479.319614 1307.561031 19338.03315 3933.329389 43478.56035 14559.71106 140626.5765 
2006 48.90396041 19.46542205 19.08829623 199.6676687 1225.346277 447.7125212 466.2802792 217.8485907 155.3642153 3155.973204 257.3045151 6050.547723 3178.26001 15441.76268 
2007 209.7076477 48.10007203 70.352063 183.9678724 1148.472301 299.8163644 438.818928 218.2165315 116.0177964 2799.027106 288.9828523 7570.435107 3333.847031 16725.76167 
2008 122.6016923 49.29439215 82.00519215 285.6391601 1312.414283 369.8554684 478.4763388 243.1542854 206.0053196 2220.96943 312.7120835 8853.899668 3043.574955 17580.60227 
2009 87.39993038 169.7937733 195.1448603 263.7147833 1502.733271 295.3387056 597.2671315 288.8558004 172.6528812 1807.676339 399.833272 9962.099381 4213.150444 19955.66057 
2010 172.3375214 135.4383654 96.96826942 360.3804622 1333.468512 333.8217602 606.3909644 134.5220091 220.0949605 2276.666525 276.3407893 9364.452268 3974.507305 19285.38971 
Source: based on OECD-CRS data. 
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The most important declaration so far has been the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 
2005, where donors, recipient countries and multilaterals agreed on five principles of ‘good 
practice’: ownership, alignment, harmonization, mutual accountability and results-based 
management. The mid-term evaluation found that although some progress was being made, it 
was not fast enough (OECD 2008b), which lead to the signing of the Accra Agenda for 
Action in 2008, to accelerate progress towards ownership, inclusive partnerships and results. 
The deadline of the Paris Declaration is now up, and its evaluation found that overall the 
quality of aid has improved, but highlights lack of transparency and aid management burden 
as impeding progress. Importantly, it calls for more realistic expectations of the contribution 
of aid to development (Wood et al. 2011). 
 
The Paris Declaration was followed by the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 
which took place in Busan in November 2011. The principles for best practice agreed are not 
too dissimilar from previous declarations with partners committing to ownership of 
development priorities by developing countries, focus on results, inclusive development 
partnerships and transparency and accountability to each other. By the middle of 2012 a set of 
indicators will be developed to monitor progress towards these principles. 
 
It is therefore important to assess what we know about the effectiveness of development 
assistance for health, successes, failures and what has worked in making aid more effective. 
After this introduction this paper will cover methodological challenges in assessing the 
effectiveness of development assistance for health, followed by a review of the current 
evidence on whether aid works. Section 3 will then outline the different aid modalities, 
examples of their successes and lessons learnt. This is followed by an overview of the factors 
hindering the effectiveness of DAH in Section 4. Section 5 will then highlight the issues 
associated with scaling up aid-funded health programmes. The paper will finish with a 
discussion summarizing key issues in the current debate on aid effectiveness and with a look 
at the future of development assistance for health, including new donors and partnerships, 
shifting donor priorities and the effect of the financial crisis on DAH. 
2 Methodological challenges in assessing aid effectiveness  
How can we study the impact of aid? One obvious way is to examine welfare benefits that 
can be attributed of aid funding to the recipient countries. In the early literature around 
growth and development, which emphasised rapid capital investment and emerged in the 
1950s after many low- and middle-income countries gained independence, it was argued that 
aid would make up the shortfall in foreign reserves and domestic savings that many countries 
consistently faced (Chenery and Strout 1966). It was also recognized that there would be 
humanitarian aid. Further, the geopolitical landscape of the Cold War ensured that foreign aid 
would flow to poorer countries which would not have expressed developmental concerns 
(Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006; Bobba and Powell 2007) . Although aid sceptics voiced 
strong views, particularly the British economist P.T. Bauer in the 1970s, a strong body of 
literature only emerged nearly ten years after the Cold War when aid giving was expressly 
meant for raising the level of wellbeing in LMICs (see bibliography in (Rajan and 
Subramanian 2008). Controversies around aid effectiveness centred on bilateral aid; multi-
lateral aid seemed to have generated very little controversy. For example, Headey (2007) 
argues that multilateral aid for 56 countries for years 1970-2001, which may have had less 
political intent, has had a positive effect. We did not find much of analysis that centred on 
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ineffectiveness of multi-lateral aid; we note below that responsiveness to, for example, 
concessionary loans seems to be positive.  
 
In answering questions around aid effectiveness, the primary concern has been growth. Given 
the recent emphasis on development assistance for health and aid aimed specifically at 
particular development aims, questions around effectiveness of particular type of funding 
have also emerged. Concerns about the process of aid-giving have also been raised. A 
question around process involves domestic fiscal response to aid; another involves questions 
around modality of offering aid. The last two questions lead to qualitative issues around 
accountability. The issues can be summarized into three categories: (1) welfare implication of 
aid; (2) fiscal response to aid; and (3) modality of aid. In this section we examine some 
methodological issues that pertain to examining aid effectiveness, whether it be overall aid 
effectiveness or sector specific effectiveness.  
2.1  Aid benefits 
Questions as to whether aid benefits recipient countries or not is methodologically 
confounded by endogeneity problems, including reverse causality. This problem is beyond 
just being a methodological issue. In recent years we note the phenomenon of being a ‘donor 
darling’ when certain countries have, starting from a surge, a large number of donors along 
with large per capita development assistance. The surge follows the recipient country 
experiencing sudden economic upturn or a period of peaceful recovery from conflict. Cassen 
(Cassen 1986) noted the tendency for aid to follow well-performing countries. Although this 
may indicate that donor countries would like to see their aid work and claim credit for good 
performing countries, it also makes it difficult to measure the impact of aid. Thus, it is 
possible we will find that aid follows good performance while lack of aid follows bad 
performance. Further, if aid improves some type of performance around education, health or 
economic growth, we should not expect the impact to be completely instantaneous but to 
have a lagged effect. As Rajan and Subramanian (2005) put it we want to know: can aid take 
a country to its potential, a higher rate of consistent economic growth rate? This entails that 
longer horizons be examined whenever impact of aid is studied (Rajan and Subramanian 
2005), which would necessitate longer run analysis. An important way of seeing if the 
potentials are met is to examine if aid affects intermediary factors such as human capital, 
health and investment, as has been done by Arndt et al. (2011). 
 
What constitutes ‘longer run’ would be a natural and empirical question to ask. Should this be 
a time when the current aid recipient countries started receiving aid? If so, the post-
independence period of 1960 to today should be the examination period. This may be an 
interesting period but the purpose and mode of aid giving has dramatically changed since the 
1960s. In 1960 a developing country on average received aid from two countries, while the 
corresponding number was 28 in 2008 (Frot and Santiso 2008). Also in this period, many of 
the larger recipients were given aid for political reasons, thus it is common to single out 
countries such as Egypt (Rajan and Subramanian 2005) and adjust for countries where 
motivations for aid may be political and not socioeconomic development. This adjustment 
does not solve the problem of endogeneity, even in a panel data with fixed effect, as one 
might notice, for example, the problem of ‘aid darlings’ might arise and disappear within the 
period of analysis. The use of fixed country effect, structural model or generalized method of 
moments with  instrumentation for aid giving to isolate the exogenous element of aid giving  
go some ways to correct for some of these problems. A host of instrumentations have been 
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used to find exclusion condition which cannot be related to economic performance (see 
(Rajan and Subramanian 2008; Hansen and Tarp 2000; Arndt et al. 2011), among others). 
Testing for exogeneity in time series, (Juselius et al. 2011) find aid is not usually exogenous. 
Most likely, the choice of the years included in the study will matter, as years since the Cold 
War may have had more economic interest attached to aid giving. One way of avoiding 
making a choice is to report on different divisions of 1960 to the present with some time 
effect. Another natural division is to report on impact of aid since the end of Cold War (Lu et 
al. 2010). The shorter period ignores the cumulative and the long-term effect of aid (Arndt et 
al. 2011).  
 
Rajan and Subramaniam (2005) along with many others concluded that total development 
assistance did not result in higher growth rate, see (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2011). The 
opposite has also been shown. Arndt et al. (2011) show a positive impact on growth through a 
structural model where life-expectancy along with investment and education are intermediary 
factors through which aid affects growth. An interesting tact is to examine effectiveness at 
the country level as done by (Dollar and Easterly 1999), finding aid ineffectiveness in 
general, and Juselius et al. (2011), finding aid effectiveness in general. Few studies have 
measured the impact of development assistance on health. As something like DAH may lack 
apparent political motivations and be expressly aimed toward improving wellbeing, some 
authors have tried to measure the impact of developmental aid setting aside non-
developmental aid such as military aid. Clemens et al. (2004) indicated that for the short run 
aid allocated to support budget and balance of payments commitments and infrastructure 
result in rising income. Similarly they speculate that aid promoting democracy, health and 
education will have a long-run impact on growth. Minoiu and Reddy (2010) show through 
Gaussian mixture model (GMM) estimation that when total is separated into developmental 
and non-developmental aid, non-developmental aid does not contribute to growth while 
developmental aid’s contribution to growth is strong.  
 
Examining the link between development assistance meant for the purpose of development 
goes some way toward seeing if DAH is effective. But it is not a direct method of measuring 
the impact. A question can be how much donor expenditure targeted as DAH contributes 
toward development. Mishra and Newhouse (2007) present some interesting discussions 
regarding inferring links between donor expenditure and developmental indicators. First, one 
might think lagged values of aid might be predictor of current development indicator along 
with country fixed effects; however, as indicated before, country fixed effects do not take 
account of country-specific factors that are time variant and may be related to health and 
DAH. Donors may respond to previous health system crises for example. Mishra and 
Newhouse estimate system GMM method for data from 1975 to 2004 to obtain a result that 
shows doubling health aid decreases infant mortality by 2 per cent in a subsequent five-year 
period. Obviously regression methods show marginal changes; thus a slightly ambitious 
interpretation the authors give is that DAH may have saved 170,000 lives at the costs of 
US$76 million ($432/life) (Mishra and Newhouse 2007). This is corroborated by Burnside 
and Dollar (1999), who find that for countries with effective public management, aid reduces 
infant mortality—they find that aid equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP reduces child mortality 
by 0.9 per cent. But on the other hand, Wilson (2011), using data from 96 high-mortality 
countries found that DAH has no effect on mortality and its effectiveness has not improved 
over time. Finally, the paper by Masanja et al. (2008) on Tanzania links drops of 24 per cent 
of child mortality with doubled expenditure on health, decentralization policies, the sector-
wide approach (SWAP) and vertical programmes to prevent malaria and improve nutrition. 
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The discussions around relevant time periods for analysis draw attention to how aid was seen 
from the point of donors. After the Cold War donors tended to express concerns over specific 
developmental aims, for example improved health. A question one can raise is: how do 
recipients view aid when it is specifically designated for a particular sector? This issue 
revolves around how DAH would be seen by the recipient country. Recipient governments 
would see DAH simply as income, although they might constrain themselves to spending at 
least the DAH amount, and adjust their expenditure accordingly.  
2.2  Fiscal spending and foreign aid 
When isolating the impact of DAH it is often asked whether it is legitimate to expect that the 
recipient sees the budget provided for health or development is as solely for the purpose of 
additional amount of expenditure on health. Thus US$100 million for health yields a health 
budget US$100 million above what the recipient would have planned on spending. This is 
known as the issue of fungibility. If donors earmark aid by specifying it as DAH then they 
expect recipient public expenditure on health should rise by exactly that much from the level 
planned. It is, of course, very difficult to observe what was planned. We take up the 
measurability issue around fungibility.  
 
Questions around fungibility stem from the literature known as the flypaper effect which is 
observed for public financing under fiscal federalism (Hines and Thaler 1995). Empirical 
findings indicate that money given to states in the USA by the federal government is actually 
spent rather than replacing state-level revenue. Of course, extra funding should result in some 
expenditure increase due to income effect, but the observation has been that funding induces 
expenditure beyond what would be predicted by income effect. The stickiness of the flypaper 
is perhaps what motivates earmarked funding in the international setting. Economic theory 
goes against the view that federal allocation earmarked for particular activities should be seen 
anything other than the regular income generated by the states, say, through income tax. As 
van de Walle and Mu (2007) point out economists would find fungibility as the norm. 
However, in international policy circles the expectation is for there to be no fungibility; the 
donor community would expect no decline in domestic expenditure when aid budget is 
increased for a particular sector. As any measure of fungibility requires that a counterfactual 
be known, a simpler question is, all things being equal, if a country receives US$1 extra in 
health aid in comparison to another country, does that lead to US$1 increase in public 
expenditure on health? The question is whether or not aid funding to government results in 
exactly the same amount of government expenditure. Feyzioglu et al. (1996) report that US$1 
increase in bilateral foreign aid induces much less than US$1 rise in government expenditure; 
the corresponding increase seems to be much higher than induced by concessionary loans 
received from multi-lateral donors. 
 
There is even the expectation of additionality; there should be some matching of increasing in 
domestic allocation as donor funding for a sector is increased (Brown et al. 2006). 
Conceptually, additionality may be easier to detect for a new programme, for example an 
HIV/AIDS programme, and this is where this concept has been emphasized. As donor 
countries put in more money, the same amount of money must be committed by the recipient 
from a point of zero funding. Fungibility is slightly different, as there is an expectation of 
some type of optimal behavior. It is easier to ask as stated before: does the total sectoral 
government expenditure, financed from resources made up of domestic revenue and foreign 
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aid targeted to the sector, increase exactly by the amount of targeted developmental aid?1 
Usually the test has been to detect whether or not the coefficient for the relation between the 
public domestic sectoral expenditure and earmarked funding is near to unity in some type of 
regression. The meaning of the coefficient is not exactly clear in welfare terms.  
 
As noted above, foreign aid was often thought of in terms of filling a gap—perhaps one can 
think of development assistance as complimenting recipients’ domestic efforts. In this view 
one would note low levels of domestic expenditure on health, say, and this low level would 
be supplemented by donor funding earmarked for health to have a total amount not too much 
beyond the DAH. In recent years, the notion that fungibiltiy should be prevented entails that 
country do not see DAH merely as an income for the overall budget; the expenditure on the 
earmarked sector would be beyond what would be predicted by income effect (van de Walle 
and Mu 2007).  
 
In examining the relation between DAH and domestic expenditure the usual issues around 
endogeneity apply. As already stated, the empirical work is not exactly testing fungibility 
which embeds a counterfactual concept; however, we will use the word ‘fungibility’ below as 
shorthand. There is also a plethora of number of indicators used as dependent variables to 
reflect fiscal commitment, such as public expenditure per capita or public expenditure as a 
ratio of GDP. 
2.3  Modality of aid-giving  
The way in which aid is distributed may have different implications. Modalities can consist 
of giving direct aid within the budgetary process in the recipient country, carrying out 
specific projects through governmental channels, or directly funding projects through the 
private sector—private providers and NGOs to provide goods at subsidised rate. Discerning 
these channels from existing datasets has been difficult. Lu et al. (2010) suggest, using their 
own imputated data as to what might be funded through the non-governmental sector in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data on foreign 
assistance, that donor contribution through private means induces governments to increase 
their expenditure at a higher rate.  
 
Another concern has been that aid is provided through multiple transfer instances and there 
are multiple donors for a single country as indicated above. Multiple events induce 
bureaucratic pressures. The presence of multiple donors induces unexpected impacts. 
Standard measures of concentration of donor activities using indices similar to the Herfindahl 
index of monopoly power indicates that fragmented aid giving is large (Acharya et al. 2006). 
The implications of fragmentation are debatable. Easterly (2002) claims donors can act as a 
de facto cartel in dictating what is done with the funding, hence the fact that the modality of 
funding dispersment does not matter. Knack and Rehman (2007) argue that it is unlikely a 
donor will internalize utilities of success and failure of other donors in a given country as the 
number of donors is large. There is diffused responsibility if the number of donors increases. 
Development assistance for health has become a favourite type of aid, as we note below. 
Thus the question of fragmentation is not inconsequential with regards to health. We also 
note below that multiple aid events, which may be more prevalent when non-government 
channels are used to deliver health, may impose a great deal of bureaucratic burden.  
                                                
1 Pack and Pack (1993); Boone (1996); Feyzioglu et al. (1998). 
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3 DAH modalities 
Despite the methodological difficulties highlighted in Section 2, the literature assessing the 
effectiveness of aid, and DAH in particular, is growing. As outlined in the introduction, 
donors disburse funding using different modalities, depending on the degree of earmarking 
and trust in country systems. This section will summarize the current knowledge on the 
different aid modalities, and highlight successes and what can be learnt from them 
3.1  Project aid 
Project aid is the most earmarked type of aid. Projects are discrete interventions usually 
delivered through parallel systems, bypassing the government, where donors have control 
over the design, monitoring, disbursement and accountability procedures, and NGOs or the 
private sector are in charge of implementation (Foster and Leavy 2001). Projects are also 
sometimes delivered using government systems, where donors control the policy conditions 
and the sector in which the project is situated, but the funds are disbursed and accounted for 
using government systems. Projects have been criticised for lacking sustainability (Leader 
and Colenso 2005), having high transaction costs (Quartey 2005; NORAD 2008) and 
hindering partner country ownership (Marshall and Ofei-Aboagye 2004).  
 
An analysis of projects financed by the World Bank throughout the years 1983-2009 (Denizer 
et al. 2011) found that the success of projects was correlated with overall country 
performance. In addition, it highlighted that the true impact of projects only becomes 
apparent over time and later evaluations tend to be less optimistic. This is particularly the 
case in the health sector, where the impact of interventions takes time to be seen. The 
evaluation found that some factors, such as high preparation costs and low country 
ownership, were associated with lower impact of projects. On the other hand, smaller size, 
good management and supervision were correlated with a higher impact of projects. 
However, the authors of the analysis (Denizer et al. 2011) do acknowledge that a significant 
proportion of the variation observed in project performance cannot be explained by these 
factors, highlighting the importance of the local context on project outcomes. A series of case 
studies conducted by the What Works Group at the Center for Global Development found 
that a World Bank funded project in China averted 30,000 cases of tuberculosis per year. The 
project’s success was associated with high levels of political commitment at all levels of 
government and the use of creative incentives to both patients and providers (Levine 2004). 
Table 2 below summarizes other studies of successful projects. 
 
Despite their criticism, projects can be effective in achieving their objectives. However, 
concerns regarding sustainability and weakening of country systems have driven the 
international community to favour programme-based approaches, such as SWAPs and budget 
support. This shift was at the heart of the Paris Declaration in 2005 and is still being pursued 
by many donors.  
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Table 2: Development assistance for health projects 
Author(s) Title Year of 
publication 
Year of study Type of 
Publication  
Type of policy 
intervention 
under analysis  
Country/Region  Rural/Urban Methodology 
used 
(experimental -
what type of 
experimental 
design; non- and 
quasi-
experimental 
approaches) 
Sample size Outcome 
variables used  
Main findings (and shortcomings) weblink (U
Denizer, C., 
Kaufmann, D. 
& Kraay, A. 
Good Countries 
or Good 
Projects? 
Macro and Micro 
Correlates of 
World Bank 
Project 
Performance  
 2011 Unspecified Working paper  Project  World  Both   Non-
experimental 
(regression 
analysis of 
World Bank 
data) 
 6,253 projects Whether project 
has met its 
development 
objective  
The study found that the success of projects was 
correlated with overall country performance. In 
addition, it highlighted that the true impact of 
projects only becomes apparent over time and later 
evaluations tend to be less optimistic. This is 
particularly the case in the health sector, where the 
impact of interventions takes time to be seen. The 
evaluation found that some factors, such as high 
preparation costs and low country ownership, were 
associated with lower impact of projects. On the 
other hand, smaller size, good management and 
supervision were correlated with a higher impact of 
projects. The authors acknowledge that a significant 
proportion of the variation observed in project 
performance cannot be explained by these factors. 
 http://docu
curated/en
od-countrie
macro-mic
bank-proje
 Munishi, G. K. Intervening to 
address 
constraints 
through health 
sector reforms in 
Tanzania: some 
gains and the 
unfinished 
business 
 2003 Unspecified  Journal article Urban health 
project 
Tanzania Urban  Non-
experimental, 
case study 
design 
Unspecified Rehabilitation of 
Dar es Salaam’s 
health services 
facilities. 
Improved 
system capacity 
to deliver health 
services. 
Implementation 
of government’s 
decentralization 
reforms 
The Dar es Salaam Urban Health Project 
succeeded in creating an organized health system, 
introducing the minimum health services package, 
strengthening monitoring and evaluation and 
improving community participation. Key in achieving 
this was the sequencing of activities, where 
structural quality was addressed before 
implementing other activities, such as the provision 
of drugs. Despite these achievements, the study 
highlights the lack of political support and the 
reliance on donor funding as concerns, particularly 
with respect to project sustainability. 
http://online
10.1002/jid
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C Edwards, S 
Saha  
From home to 
hospital, a 
continuum of 
care: 
making progress 
towards 
Millennium 
Development 
Goals 4 and 5 in 
rural 
Bangladesh 
 2011  Journal article   Integrated 
maternal and 
child health 
project 
Bangladesh Rural Non-
experimental 
 Proportion of 
mothers 
receiving 
antenatal care. 
Choosing a 
community 
skilled birth 
attendant. 
Having access 
to caesarean 
section. 
Having post-
partum care 
The study found that women living in the catchment 
area of the project have much better outcomes than 
the national average. The authors attribute this to 
the integrated system of care, providing a 
continuum of care between the hospital and the 
home, the provision of health worker training and 
community involvement. However, the study 
acknowledges that the model is very resource-
intensive and would not be replicable by the 
government, hence being aid-dependent and 
potentially unsustainable. 
 http://onlin
10.1111/j.1
0528.2011
Buse, K., Ludi, 
E. & Vigneri, M. 
Beyond the 
village : The 
transition from 
rural 
investments to 
national plans to 
reach the 
MDGs. 
Sustaining and 
scaling up the 
Millennium 
Villages 
 2008   Evaluation 
report 
Millennium 
Village Project  
Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Malawi, Uganda  
 Rural Non-
experimental 
  Distribution of 
long-lasting 
insecticide-
treated bednets. 
Malaria 
treatment rates. 
Deliveries 
attended by 
trained health 
workers/birth 
attendants. 
Vitamin A 
supplements. 
Immunization. 
Deworming. 
Voluntary 
counselling and 
testing. 
Anti-retroviral 
therapy. 
Health services 
utilization 
The villages taking part in the project have achieved 
huge gains in all of their health indicators, although 
some differences are observed across countries 
and indicators. The success of the project is linked 
to the concentration of resources at the community 
level and the priority given to lowcost, effective 
interventions. There are concerns, however, about 
the scalability of the project to the national level, as 
the budget is too limited to address upstream 
investments, rural-urban linkages and infrastructure 
and institutional constraints. 
  
Mize L. S., 
Harrison, M., 
Hoekman, N., 
Mercer, M. A. & 
Thompson, S 
Health Alliance 
International: 
Improving 
maternal and 
newborn 
health in Timor 
Leste final 
evaluation 
report. 
2008  2008 Project 
evaluation report 
Child Survival 
Grant 
Timor-Leste  Rural Before-after 
study 
 7 districts Proportion of 
women with 
children aged 
under two who 
received one or 
more antenatal 
visits. Last 
delivery was 
attended by a 
skilled birth 
attendant. 
Received at 
least two tetanus 
toxoid vaccine in 
their last 
pregnancy.  
Received 
Vitamin A 
supplement 
post-partum 
The project met and exceeded its objectives. The 
evaluation attributes the success of the project to 
the technical ability of its staff and  the investments 
made on their skills, accepting leadership from 
government, research and community consultations 
carried out before designing the project and the use 
of video and photographic materials for health 
promotion.  
 http://pdf.u
ACM429.p
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Exclusively 
breastfed in the 
first months 
Hounton, S., 
Menten, J., 
Ouédraogo, M., 
Dubourg, D., 
Meda, N., 
Ronsmans, C., 
Byass, P. & De 
Browere, V. 
Effects of a 
skilled care 
iInitiative on 
pregnancy-
related mortality 
in rural Burkina 
Faso. 
2009 2006 Journal article Skilled Care 
Initiative 
Burkina Faso Rural Quasi-
experimental 
2 districts Pregnancy 
related mortality. 
Utilization of 
maternal health 
services 
The study found that the Skilled Care Initiative 
project increased the number of babies delivered at 
health facilities (the aim of the project); however, it 
had no effect on pregnancy related mortality. The 
authors also found a low rate of caesarean 
sections, which they interpret to mean that 
substantial barriers still exist to service delivery, 
which may explain the lack of impact on health 
outcomes.  
http://www
med/18578
Source: authors’ illustration. 
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3.2  Programme-based approaches 
Programme-based approaches (PBAs) are defined by the OECD as having the following 
characteristics:  
1. being lead by the partner country; 
2. having a single, comprehensive programme and budget framework; 
3. donor co-ordination and harmonization of donor procedures for budgeting, 
management, procurement and reporting; 
4. increased use of partner country systems (OECD 2008a). 
They encompass basket funding, SWAPs, and budget support. They also include project aid 
that is delivered as part of a SWAP or pooled through a basket fund. Driven by the discontent 
with traditional project aid, donors committed to giving two-thirds of their aid in the form of 
PBAs by 2010 at the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. However, the mid-term 
evaluation found that the proportion of aid delivered as PBAs had only increased from 43 per 
cent in 2005 to 47 per cent in 2007 (OECD 2008a). The final evaluation of the Paris 
Declaration found that with a few exceptions, such as Uganda, there had been no rapid or 
linear move towards PBAs, with most of the evaluated countries and donors delivering aid 
using mixed modalities. In fact, it found a general reluctance on the part of the donors to 
move towards these approaches, mainly due to the slow pace of public reforms, which 
contributed to high fragmentation of aid. However, it also found that although PBAs require 
more effort than traditional project aid, they resulted in higher policy influence by the donors 
(for instance, in better targeting of expenditure on poorer communities), and better 
understanding of performance-based approaches by the partner governments, which lead the 
evaluators to reinforce the suitability of PBAs as the core target of the Paris Declaration, and 
to recommend it be included in further declarations and policy discussions (Wood et al. 
2011). Examples of PBAs are shown in Table 3. SWAPs and budget support are discussed 
below. 
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Table 3: Programme-based approaches 
Author(s) Title Year of 
publication 
Year of study Type of 
Publication 
Type of policy 
intervention 
under analysis 
Country/ 
Region 
Methodology 
used 
Sample size Outcome 
variables used 
Main findings (and shortcomings) web link (URL) 
Chansa, C. 
Sundewall, J. 
McIntyre, D. 
Tomson, G. 
Forsberg, B. 
C.  
Exploring 
SWAP 
contribution to 
the efficient 
allocation and 
use of 
resources in 
the health sect
or in Zambia. 
 
 2008 2005-2007 Journal article SWAP Zambia  Non-
experimental, 
case study 
approach 
26 
stakeholders 
(21 in-depth 
interviews and 
one group 
interview) 
Administrative, 
technical and 
allocative 
efficiency 
The SWAP was not found to have 
achieved the expected improvements 
in efficiency. The authors attribute 
this to the partial implementation of 
the SWAP or the fact that it had not 
been embraced by all donors. 
Although they do not classify the 
SWAP approach as unsuccessful, the 
authors find it ineffective in its current 
form. 
 http://heapol.oxf
nt/23/4/244.long 
Buse, K. Keeping a tight 
grip on the 
reins: donor 
control over 
aid 
co-ordination 
and 
management 
in Bangladesh 
1999 1996 - 1997 Journal article SWAP Bangladesh  Non-
experimental, 
case study 
Discussions 
with 87 
stakeholders 
and  
22 semi-
structured 
questionnaires  
Effectiveness 
of aid co-
ordination 
instruments 
The study found that the SWAP did 
not succeed in allowing the 
government to play a leading role in 
aid management. This is in part due 
to donors not trusting country 
systems and in part because of the 
politics and power associated with aid 
co-ordination and particularly, with 
having a leading role.  
 http://heapol.oxf
nt/14/3/219.full.p
Bowie, C. 
Mwase, T. 
  
Assessing the 
use of an 
essential 
health package 
in a sector 
wide approach 
in Malawi. 
2011  2008 Journal article SWAP Malawi Cost-
effectiveness 
analysis 
55 Essential 
Health 
Package 
interventions 
Technical 
efficiency, 
defined as ‘the 
efficient 
delivery of 
health care to 
a population, 
through an 
analysis of the 
appropriatenes
s of the EHP 
interventions 
and their 
coverage’ 
This study found that the SWAP 
invested in more cost-effective 
interventions than donor 
governments acting on their own. 
This leads the authors to conclude 
that the SWAP has resulted in an 
improvement in health service 
delivery at low cost. 
 http://www.healt
systems.com/co
9-4.pdf 
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Lister, S., 
Carter, R. et al. 
Joint 
Evaluation of 
General 
Budget 
Support 1994-
2004 
 2006 2005 Evaluation 
report 
General 
budget support 
(GBS) 
Burkina Faso, 
Malawi, 
Mozambique 
Nicaragua, 
Rwanda, 
Uganda, 
Vietnam 
 Non-
experimental, 
case study 
approach 
7 country case 
studies 
GBS 
relevancy, 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
in achieving a 
sustainable 
impact in 
poverty 
reduction and 
growth 
promotion. 
Partnership GBS (PGBS) was found 
to improve harmonization, alignment 
and policy development on all 
countries reviewed, as well as having 
a positive influence on allocative and 
technical efficiency of public financial 
management in five of the countries. 
However, the study also found that 
unpredictability and volatility of PGBS 
were a problem. 
 http://www.oecd
746,en_2157136
79_1_1_1_1,00.
Caputo, E., de 
Kemp, A & 
Lawson, A. 
Assessing the 
impacts of 
budget 
support: Case 
studies in Mali, 
Tunisia and 
Zambia 
2011 2010 Working paper General and 
sector budget 
support 
Mali, Tunisia 
and Zambia 
 Non-
experimental, 
case study 
approach 
Three country 
case studies 
Extent to which 
budget support 
provides means 
for 
implementing 
national and 
sectoral 
priorities 
Efficiency and 
effectiveness of 
national 
priorities 
Sustainable 
outcomes and 
impacts on 
growth 
They study found that budget support 
had resulted in better budget 
management, although its design, 
harmonization and alignment ere not 
optimal. In addition, the authors found 
that budget support was associated 
with increased public expenditure on 
social services, which resulted in 
improvements in health. For instance, 
in Zambia increased health service 
provision was associated with a 
decrease in the incidence of 
tuberculosis, malaria, diarrhoea and 
maternal and child mortality. 
However, the study highlights 
concerns with respect to the quality of 
these services. 
http://www.oecd.
8934753.pdf  
Visser-Valfrey, 
M. & Umarji, 
M. B. 
Sector Budget 
Support in 
Practice 
Case Study 
Health Sector 
in 
Mozambique 
 2010  2008 Project report Sector budget 
support 
Mozambique   Non-
experimental, 
case study 
approach 
36 stakeholder 
interviews  
Extent to which 
SBS has met 
the objectives 
of partner 
country and 
donors 
The study found an increase in the 
number of donors engaging in sector 
budget support, better co-ordination 
and a positive influence on sector 
management, policy and monitoring 
and evaluation. However, it also 
found that more progress is needed 
in improving the budgeting process, 
systems for financing de-centralized 
services and technical assistance 
and capacity development.  
 http://www.odi.o
6405.pdf  
Source: authors’ illustration. 
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3.3  Sector-wide approaches 
Sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) arose in the mid 1990s as a result of the prevailing 
discontent with project aid (Harrold and and associates 1995). Although there is no 
agreed definition of precisely what SWAPs involve, they are a co-ordination mechanism 
for donors working on the same sector that aims to improve donor co-ordination, 
government ownership and lower transaction costs of aid (Sundewall and Sahlin-
Andersson 2006, Hutton and Tanner 2004). In essence, a SWAP represents a 
partnership between donors and the partner government, lead by the health ministry of 
the partner government (Hutton and Tanner 2004). The terms of this partnership are 
often agreed in advance, and vary between different countries (Sundewall and Sahlin-
Andersson 2006). SWAPs are often associated with delivering aid as budget support, 
further supporting partner ownership and country systems.  
 
Box 1: Health sector-wide approaches in practice: the cases of Zambia and 
Bangladesh 
The sector wide approach was introduced in the Zambian health sector in 1993, with the aim of aligning 
and co-ordinating aid, as well as supporting the plans of the health ministry (ODI and Mokoro 2009). 
Chansa et al. (2008) carried out an evaluation of the Zambian SWAP in 2008 with the aim of assessing its 
contribution to efficiency, in the form of administrative, technical and allocative efficiency. The study 
found that the proportion of funds channelled through the SWAP made only modest increases during 
1998-2005. In addition, the evaluation found that many donors were still operating outside the SWAP, 
with this trend increasing rather than moving towards a more harmonized approach. In terms of 
efficiency, the study found that the SWAP had resulted in small improvements in administrative 
efficiency, although transaction costs remained high, due to the amount and intensity of related meetings, 
which happened alongside meetings for donors operating outside of the SWAP—a fact probably 
enhanced by the arrival of global health initiatives in the time period of study. The authors of the 
evaluation found that both the funding to hospitals and the bed occupancy rate in these decreased since 
the introduction of the SWAP, resulting in a decrease in technical efficiency. Finally, the evaluation found 
small improvements in the allocative efficiency of the budget execution, particularly at the level of district 
funding. The results of this evaluation are disappointing, although the authors do not rule out the SWAP 
as a successful co-ordination model, they do conclude that the set up of the Zambian SWAP was not 
effective (Chansa et al. 2008). 
 
The Bangladesh SWAP—known as the Health, Nutrition and Population Programme—started in 1998. It 
is often referred to as the biggest and oldest SWAP and has been the subject of a few evaluations. A study 
carried out by White (2007) found that the health SWAP in Bangladesh had succeeded in lowering 
transaction costs, and that the associated budget support had been a successful funding mechanism. 
However, the study also found that donors were still driving the policy process and that projects were too 
complex. Amongst the recommendations, White stressed the need for donors to adopt a more ‘hands-off’ 
approach, giving the government space to make their own decisions and restraining from criticism, whilst 
investing in its monitoring and accountability systems ((White 2007). Other studies of the Bangladeshi 
SWAP have found donors’ unwillingness to fully participate due to lack of trust in country systems (Buse 
1999) and that despite of the clear contributions the SWAP has made towards donor alignment and 
predictability, and strengthening national health policy, the SWAP has failed to bring about 
organizational and governance reforms, government ownership, as well as stopping donors from 
developing parallel systems (Martinez 2008). However, the failure of the SWAP mechanism to fully 
achieve its intended results is not seen as a consequence of the inappropriateness of the SWAP model, but 
rather as a result of its implementation. The lack of success is seen as a consequence of the poor quality of 
the underlying health plans and monitoring systems, rather than on the SWAP itself (Martinez 2008). 
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Although the evidence on the impact of the sector wide approach mechanism on the 
health sector is mixed (Box 1), it is important to take into account that the SWAP 
mechanism involves a reform in the way aid is given and in the relationship between the 
donors and the government, which means it will take time for the impact to be seen 
(Hutton and Tanner 2004). In addition, the SWAP can be seen as a set of principles to 
give aid, but its implementation varies between the different countries, as the local 
political and cultural context have been found to influence the ‘shape’ of the SWAP in 
different countries, and hence its effectiveness (Sundewall and Sahlin-Andersson 2006).  
3.4  Budget support 
Budget support is a type of programme-based approach that is characterized by having 
little or no earmarking. There are two types of budget support: general budget and 
sector budget support. General budget support involves donors providing aid directly to 
the government’s budget, linked to a poverty reduction strategy. Success of budget 
support is dependent on the governance and policy environment of the partner country, 
with concerns regarding corruption and misuse of funds (Bourguignon and Sundberg 
2007). During 2002-06 only 6.4 per cent of all aid was allocated as budget support (Piva 
P 2009), reflecting donors’ concerns and unwillingness to engage in this aid modality. 
However, the popularity of budget support is growing (Marshall and Ofei-Aboagye 
2004), particularly amongst European donors. A study of general budget support in 
seven countries over 1994-2004 found positive results in all but two countries. It found 
that, overall, it was a relevant aid modality and that general budget support increased 
government ownership, accountability and capacity for public financial management. In 
addition, it enhanced the quality of aid by improving donor harmonization and 
alignment (Dom 2007). These findings have been corroborated in further studies (Carter 
and Lister 2007; Marshall and Ofei-Aboagye 2004; Leader and Colenso 2005). 
 
Although donors do not select how the funds are distributed, negotiations of general 
budget support can increase budget allocation to the health sector. In addition, budget 
support can be delivered as sector budget support, where funds are earmarked to a 
particular sector, often the health and education sectors. A study of ten sectors in six 
African countries found that sector budget support had improved the efficiency of 
public resource use by supporting planning, budgeting, management and accountability 
processes. However, it found that although access to services had been greatly 
expanded, the quality and equity in the delivery of these services had not (Williamson 
and Dom 2010). Another study found sector budget support to lower transaction costs of 
aid programmes (Dom 2007) 
3.5  Global health initiatives 
Recent increases in the levels of development assistance for health have not only been 
associated with different funding modalities but with the arising of new donors and 
initiatives. Since the year 2000, there has been a proliferation in global health initiatives 
(GHI), which tend to focus on a single disease or group of diseases. Some of the more 
prominent GHIs include the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Global Fund for 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the GAVI Alliance in support of childhood  
  
  18
Box 2: Global Health Initiatives 
Global Health Initiatives (GHIs) have been successful in bringing specific health problems into the global 
health agenda and in gathering large amounts of resources to tackle them. However, they have also been 
at the centre of criticisms for drawing resources away from broader health system issues and further 
complicating the aid architecture. Two large studies have been conducted to assess the interactions 
between GHIs and country health systems and the impact of GHIs on country co-ordination mechanisms.  
 
The first of these studies, conducted by the Maximising Positive Synergies Collaborative Group at the 
World Health Organization, reviewed 221 existing reports and conducted 15 new studies to assess the 
interactions between GHIs and health systems. The study analysed these interactions in six different 
dimensions: health service delivery, health financing, governance, health workforce, health information 
systems and supply management systems.  
 
The study found mixed results. In terms of health service delivery—defined as access, equity and 
coverage—the report found that while access to services targeted by GHIs increased, there was mixed 
evidence regarding access to other services. GHIs were accredited to have made some contribution to 
equity but not towards the causes of inequity or social determinants of health. In addition, whilst GHIs 
were found to improve quality by the provision of guidelines, there were also concerns that pressure on 
performance had compromised quality of services. With regards to health financing, it was found that 
GHIs resulted in an increase in funding, improved the availability of free services at the point of care 
(albeit not systematically) and contributed to improvements in predictability of aid funding. However, 
alignment with national priorities or the burden of disease was weak. GHIs were found to have an overall 
positive influence on health sector governance, by exposing weaknesses, improving accountability and 
productivity, and increasing capacity and community participation. Nevertheless, there were worries that 
the performance-based approach employed by GHIs may distort these indicators towards their specific 
targets. In terms of health information systems and supply management systems, GHIs have resulted in 
improvements in both, but only for their targeted diseases. In addition, they were also found to create 
parallel systems and, in the case of supply chains, to duplicate and displace local systems, resulting from a 
lack of co-ordination. 
 
The study concludes that GHIs and country health systems are dynamic and inter-connected, and have 
positive and negative effects on each other, although policies to ensure the maximization of positive 
interactions are missing. The study recommends that the health systems strengthening agenda be given 
the same ambition and speed that characterises GHIs, to introduce health systems targets to existing 
GHIs, to improve alignment between GHIs and country health systems, for more data to be generated on 
costs and benefits of improving health systems, and for increases in funding for health systems in a 
predictable manner. 
 
The second study, Spicer et al. (2010), examined the effects of three GHIs—the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
and the World Bank’s Multi-country AIDS Programme (MAP)—on co-ordination in seven countries in 
Europe, Asia, Africa and South America. The study involved 379 in-depth interviews with stakeholders at 
the national and sub-national level. Overall, it was found that different contexts actually shared similar 
experiences. The study found that GHIs, particularly the Global Fund, had a positive effect on national 
level co-ordination and have achieved wide stakeholder participation, although participation from non-
health government departments and civil society organizations (CSOs) remained weak. Country 
ownership, on the other hand, was found to be inhibited by weak decision-making power of co-ordination 
mechanisms, particularly at the sub-sector level. Although some improvements in ownership were 
observed over time, the study found that a lack of transparency and communication, competition for 
resources, and weak secretariat and managerial capabilities were impeding further progress. 
 
A number of recommendations to improve the co-ordination and therefore the effectiveness of GHIs are 
made. These include improving secretariat capacity at national and regional level through financial and 
technical support, better positioning of co-ordination mechanisms within government to enhance their 
authority, increasing financial and training support to CSOs to improve their participation at the national 
and regional level, and better definitions of the roles of the members of national and sub-national co-
ordination structures. 
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vaccination and the Stop TB Partnership. However, there are many others. Their 
increase in popularity (and funding) has sparked a debate between vertical, disease-
focused programme and horizontal health system approaches. 
 
Proponents for ‘vertical’ disease-focused programmes advocate that the urgency of 
tackling the spread of some diseases means specific programmes have to be designed 
and implemented for them (Biesma et al. 2009, World Health Organization Maximizing 
Positive Synergies Collaborative Group et al. 2009). On the other hand, broader health 
systems constraints have been identified as slowing down progress towards making 
improvements in these diseases, and in health more generally (Cavalli et al. 2010, 
Lieberman et al. 2009, Shiffman 2006b). There has been mixed evidence on the impact 
of vertical programmes on the health system, although it has been found that weak 
health systems are particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of GHIs (Cavalli et al. 
2010). 
 
The evidence on which this debate is based is scarce, with both sides using anecdotal 
evidence to make their case. However, some recent studies have shed some light on this. 
A multi-country review carried out by the World Health Organization’s Positive 
Synergies Collaborative Group (2009) found that although there were significant gaps 
in the data, there was potential for global health initiatives to positively interact and 
reinforce the health system. A seven-country study by Spicer et al. (2010) found that 
although GHIs (the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria particularly) have 
had positive effects on co-ordination at the national level, they increased the complexity 
of the aid architecture, undermined alignment and lacked harmonization, especially at 
the sub-national level (Spicer et al. 2010). In contrast, Dodd and Lane (2010) found that 
global health partnerships have successfully innovated new approaches to raising and 
delivering funds and can provide longer-term funding, from which other donors should 
learn—more details on these can be found in Box 2. 
 
A third ‘middle’ way has been put forward, known as the ‘diagonal’ approach. This 
approach consists of using single disease projects and programmes to address broader 
health systems issues, such as human resources, drug supply and financing (Frenk et al. 
2003). However, there are warnings that unless accompanied by an increase in funding, 
this new approach will fail (Ooms et al. 2008). Examples of the diagonal approach 
include the Global Fund’s health systems strengthening programmes2 and PEPFAR’s 
investments in human resources, supply chains and health systems infrastructure 
(Moore and Morrison 2007). 
4 Factors affecting the effectiveness of DAH 
4.1  Allocation of DAH 
As outlined in the introduction, the amount of DAH disbursed has increased 
dramatically over the past ten years. However, this increase has been uneven both 
between countries and across different health priorities. The share of DAH allocated to 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has increased steadily (albeit departing from low levels of 
investments in the sector, see Table 1) to account for 29 per cent of all DAH in 2008, 
                                                
2 Globa Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (2007). 
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making it the best-funded region in the world (Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation 2010), which also reflects the severe deficits in health service provision in 
the region.  
 
A cross-country analysis found no correlation between countries’ GDP per capita and 
the amount of DAH they received, although this is improving (Ravishankar et al. 2009). 
This should not be taken as a measure of whether DAH has resulted in increased 
growth, but rather as an assessment of whether DAH is provided to countries that need 
it most. Some problems arise when contrasting total DAH with GDP per capita, as a few 
newly emerging middle-income countries—such as India, Pakistan and China—have 
large populations and receive large total amounts of foreign aid. India was actually the 
largest recipient of DAH in 2007; however the per capita DAH it received is actually 
low compared to almost all lower-income countries. Given that expressed motive for 
development assistance is to aid poor countries, DAH distribution is fairly consistent 
with this motive. Figure 1 shows the relation between the cumulative proportion of poor 
(defined as living under US$1 a day) and the cumulative amount of health official 
development assistance (ODA) distributed for 56 countries, including India and China, 
but excluding countries with a population smaller than one million and for which DAH 
made up less than 1 per cent of their total government budget. These countries were 
ranked by per capita income, averaged over 1995-2006. For this sample of countries, the 
first 25 countries amounted to containing 26 per cent of the total poor while the amount 
of health ODA going to these countries amounted to 51.5 per cent of the total amount of 
aid in our sample. Of these countries 22 were in SSA, two in South Asia and one in 
Central Asia. The 26th country is India, home to 44 percent of the poor people in our 
sample. India received 17 per cent of the health ODA. At the point of India in Figure 1 
the cumulative proportions are equalized.   
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of health ODA in relation with the distribution of poor 
in 2006 
 
Source: authors’ illustration using OECD and World Bank poverty data from 2004-06. 
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Another indicator that may be important is the proportion of total health expenditure 
that DAH makes up; after all, DAH should make up the short-fall in health expenditure 
for poor countries. The evidence suggests that DAH measured as the amount going into 
a country makes up a larger share of total health expenditure for poor countries. 
Figure 2 depicts this relationship. Here we show that DAH is distributed in a pro-poor 
manner. In some countries DAH does nearly make up the entire public sector health 
budget. Although the political economic implications of this relationship are not clear, 
DAH makes up a large proportion of the health expenditure and budget for poor 
countries.    
Figure 2: DAH as a share of total health expenditure and log income, average 2004-08 
 
Source: authors’ illustration using OECD and World Bank income data 2004-08. 
 
Given the increase in earmarked project funding, one implication of the foreign source 
of health expenditure being large centres on whether the project funding meet the 
priorities within a country. The literature highlights some (but not full) correlations 
between countries’ burden of disease and the level of funding they receive (Ravishankar 
et al. 2009; MacKellar 2005). For instance, Ravishankar et al. (ibid.) found that of the 
US$13.8 billion DAH in 2007 for which project-level information was available, 
US$4.9 billion was spent on HIV/AIDS, compared with US$0.6 billion on tuberculosis, 
US$0.7 billion on malaria, and US$0.9 billion on health sector support. Another study 
found that non-communicable diseases received US$0.78 per disability-adjusted life 
year (DALY) in 2007, compared to US$23.9 per DALY attributable to HIV, 
tuberculosis, and malaria (Nugent 2010). Differences in funding are also observed 
amongst the goods and services that are funded; for instance, more funding is allocated 
to the procurement of drugs than to human resources or infrastructure (Juliet et al. 
2009). Analysis of OECD Creditor Reporting System data shows the prominence of 
HIV funding, but also recent increases in broader health systems priorities: 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
D
AH
, s
ha
re
 o
f H
ea
lth
 E
xp
4 5 6 7 8 9
log Income
DAH_Share lowess DAH_Share log_income
  22
Figure 3: Trends in priorities of development assistance for health (2009 constant US$ 
billion commitments) 
 
Source: Tandon (unpublished), compiled from OECD-DAC data, reproduced with permission from author. 
 
If funding decisions are not fully based on disease burden, then what other factors are 
influencing donors’ choices? Discussions in the literature indicate that donors have non-
altruistic motives. Countries may use DAH as a strategy within their foreign policy and 
security (Labonte and Gagnon 2010); for instance, to control infectious diseases that 
pose a threat to donors’ national security (Shiffman 2006a; Shiffman et al. 2002). In 
addition, there is some evidence that priorities are set to serve the interest of donor 
countries’ foreign policy and trade agenda (Feldbaum and Michaud 2010).  
 
The current distribution of DAH affects its effectiveness in two ways. First, resources 
are not directed to where they are most needed, and hence are not achieving their 
potential impact. Second, the popularity of some countries and priorities means that 
donors and implementing agencies crowd around them, resulting in duplication and 
competition (see fragmentation below). 
4.2  Predictability 
By its very nature, DAH is discretionary spending for donors, and as such can be 
extremely unpredictable. Predictability is defined by the OECD as the provision of 
long-term indicative figures of aid flows, as well as the disbursement of committed 
funds in a timely manner (OECD 2008a). Donors often fail in both dimensions. A panel 
regression in 60 low-income countries for the time period 1990-2005 found that, on 
average, levels of annual aid disbursements and commitments differed greatly, 
particularly in SSA. It also found that this had only shown small improvements over 
time. Perhaps surprisingly, lack of predictability was found both as shortfalls and as 
excesses in the amounts of funds expected, with SSA countries more likely to receive 
excess disbursements (Celasun and Walliser 2008). This has been corroborated in 
single-country studies in Uganda (Orem et al. 2009) and Zambia (Sundewall et al. 
2009). Other studies have found significant differences between countries (Strategic 
Partnership for Africa–Budget Support Working Group 2005), and that the poorest 
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countries are particularly affected by the unpredictability of DAH (Celasun and Walliser 
2008). 
 
Different reasons are found in the literature for the lack of predictability of aid flows. A 
survey of donors found that unmet policy conditions, donor administrative problems, 
recipient government delays in meeting conditions and political problems in the donor 
country all contributed to a lack of predictability (Strategic Partnership for Africa–
Budget Support Working Group 2005). Celasum and Walliser (2008) found that 25 per 
cent of unpredictability was explained by recipient country stability and levels of aid 
disbursed. They blamed the rest on ‘fickle’ donor behaviour (Celasun and Walliser 
2008). This lack of predictability has lead to DAH only funding the developing budget 
in countries such as Tanzania, as recurrent costs need to be constant, and hence it is 
risky to have them depend on external assistance. 
 
Lack of predictability can hinder aid effectiveness in several ways. First, it hinders 
recipient governments’ ability to plan their budgets (Orem et al. 2009). This is a 
particularly important problem in the health sector, as health systems development is a 
long-term process, where many costs are recurrent, resulting in governments being 
reluctant to scale up activities (Vassall and Martinez Alvarez 2011, Dodd and Lane 
2010). Furthermore, budget aid that is larger than planned for may not be incorporated 
into the budget, and its expenditure will either be delayed or allocated to recurrent rather 
than investment spending. Second, lack of predictability has resulted in recipient 
ministries of finance being unwilling to allow long-term health spending commitments 
(Cavagnero et al. 2008), hence contributing to fungibility. Third, unpredictable aid 
undermines recipient governments’ budgets by forcing adjustments in expenditure and 
changes in original allocations during budget execution, hindering the achievement of 
government objectives, and disrupting the implementation of poverty reduction 
strategies (Celasun and Walliser 2006).  
4.3  Fragmentation 
As mentioned in Section 2, increased levels of development funding have resulted in the 
proliferation of the number of donors and the amount of projects and programmes they 
fund. This phenomenon is known as fragmentation. Fragmentation, which has been 
associated with decreased DAH effectiveness, affects countries differently (Frot and 
Santiso 2010). A study by Frot and Santiso (2010) found that poor and stable 
democratic countries, such as Tanzania, which had 1,601 aid projects in 2007, suffer 
most from fragmentation. The authors suggested that this was associated with donors 
preferring stronger institutions, which are found in these countries.  
 
There are several reasons why fragmentation of DAH decreases its effectiveness. 
Acharya et al. (2006) classify these as direct and indirect costs. The direct (transaction) 
costs are a result of both the large number of donors, which require substantial amounts 
of senior officials’ time, and the amount of projects they fund, which incur a 
considerable managing and reporting burden for governmental authorities (Acharya et 
al. 2006). Indirect costs include aid agencies attracting public servants away from the 
government, thereby exacerbating staff shortages (Aldasoro et al. 2010); time and 
money spent by donors on technical assistance and training of local staff, which results 
in reduced worker productivity (Acharya et al. 2006; Mueller et al. 2011); governments 
finding it easier to protect their interests as donors can exert less pressure by acting 
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alone (Burnell 2002), but having to balance out many different interests; more difficult 
co-ordination resulting in duplication; and, lack of individual sense of responsibility 
(Knack and Rahman 2007).  
4.4  Fungibility 
The issue of fungibility is often hotly debated in discussions concerning the 
effectiveness of DAH. Methodological issues encountered when assessing fungibility 
were discussed in Section 2. Here, we outline the current views on the matter. 
Fungibility is the process by which the recipient government ‘offsets donor spending for 
a particular purpose by reducing its own expenditures on the same purpose ... therefore 
aid substitutes rather than supplements local spending’ (Foster and Leavy 2001). The 
existence of fungibility of development assistance has been documented extensively in 
the literature from as early as 1993 (Pack and Pack 1993, World Bank 1998). 
Fungibility can occur at the macroeconomic (Gottret and Schieber 2006), sector (Farag 
et al. 2009, Gottret and Schieber 2006, Lu et al. 2010) and subsector (Shiffman 2008, 
Gottret and Schieber 2006) level. Although the data available on health sector spending 
in low-income countries is often scarce and of bad quality, several studies have found 
that it is particularly affected by fungibility (Lancaster 1999). Estimates of the extent of 
fungibility in the health sector for every dollar spent vary from a decrease in US$0.27-
$1.65 (Farag et al. 2009, Gottret and Schieber 2006, Lu et al. 2010) to a US$1.50 
increase (Mishra and Newhouse 2007). Much of these calculations in regards to DAH 
depend on methodologies used including how the dependent variable is constructed. 
Some attempt needs to be made in regards to critically survey this literature.  
 
Merely documenting whether fungibility takes place is insufficient, it is more important 
to explore why it happens (Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 2004; Ooms et al. 2010) and 
whether it is detrimental to DAH effectiveness. Some factors have been associated with 
increased fungibility, including low levels of recipient country income (Farag et al. 
2009), fragmentation (Gottret and Schieber 2006), lack of predictability and the short-
nature of DAH flows (Farag et al. 2009; Gottret and Schieber 2006), and lack of 
information (Halonen 2004). It is also important to explore why governments may 
choose to divert their spending from the health sector. It may be a government’s way of 
reallocating funding to other sectors, to anticipate the long-term unreliability of DAH, 
or to smooth DAH by spreading it across different years (Farag et al. 2009), a practice 
advised by the IMF (Stuckler et al. 2011).  
 
Fungibility is often highlighted as a cause of aid ineffectiveness, as donor funds 
substitute rather than complement recipient governments’ budget for health, and some 
studies consider it synonymous with corruption (Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 2004). 
However, fungibility has also been described as a rational and responsible response to 
DAH, resulting from donors’ and recipients’ differing priorities (Gottret and Schieber 
2006; McGillivray and Morrissey 2000), where recipient governments reallocate the 
resources available to them according to their priorities (Waddington 2004). It may be 
seen as an indication that the recipient governments are aware of the DAH coming into 
the country, which may explain why funds channelled through NGOs do not result in 
fungibility (Sridhar and Woods 2010). In addition, some studies have concluded that 
fungibility has limited consequences (McGillivray and Morrissey 2000; Wagstaff 2011), 
that it is too narrow a concept to analyse aid effectiveness (Pettersson 2007), and that it 
may distract from the real issues (McGillivray and Morrissey 2000). 
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4.5  DAH relationships 
In Section 2 we mentioned that the process of giving aid is in itself often a subject of 
study. Here we outline the current thinking on these issues. It is first important to 
acknowledge that DAH ineffectiveness is not just the responsibility of a particular actor 
or agency, but of the system of relationships that it generates. A variety of actors are 
involved in the delivery and use of DAH. These actors form dynamic and interactive 
relationships, which are shaped by differing underlying incentives, motivations, and 
information and power asymmetries and often result in lack of accountability (Eyben 
2006, Holvoet and Renard 2007, Gibson et al. 2005, Alonso 2004). This section will 
explore the notions of accountability, incentives and information and power 
asymmetries that characterise DAH relationships. 
 
Accountability is understood as the ‘means by which individuals and organizations are 
held responsible for their actions’ (Edwards and Hulme 1996). It is considered vital to 
the effectiveness of DAH, and has been repeatedly called for in the various declarations 
and commitments to aid effectiveness (Organisation for Economic and Development 
2008, Balabanova et al. 2010). Accountability should happen at all stages of the aid 
process, from decision-making, through implementation, monitoring, and evaluation 
(Kapur and Whittle 2010). There are four components to a well-functioning 
accountability system: a clear statement of goals (ODA 1993), transparency of decision-
making and use of funds (Ebrahim 2005; Ebrahim 2010, World Bank 2006), an 
appraisal process with published results (Ebrahim 2010; ODA 1993), and mechanisms 
for holding those responsible to account (ODA 1993). 
 
In theory, beneficiaries should hold donors and implementing agencies to account, and 
donors and implementing agencies should be mutually accountable to one other for the 
distribution and outcomes of DAH. However, accountability should not be regarded as a 
linear process, as the many actors involved interact to form a complex web of 
relationships (Ebrahim 2005; Eyben 2006).  
 
Repeated calls for mutual accountability between donors and recipient governments 
have proven difficult to implement in practice. Several reasons have been put forward in 
the literature for this. First, the DAH system faces the problem of being a ‘global public 
good’, where every country can benefit from improved health indicators and 
development in general (Alonso 2004), which may result in donors eluding individual 
responsibilities, as the rewards will be shared amongst all donors. Second, donors’ main 
accountability line is to their funders—the taxpayers (Haan 2009), and they therefore 
feel less responsibility towards the recipient government for their actions. Donor 
incentives are also often skewed towards spending of funds rather than achieving 
results, a trend known as the ‘money-moving syndrome’ (Monkam 2008b), which 
hinders accountability to beneficiaries. Third, accountability lines within donors mean 
that country offices are accountable to their headquarters, rather than the recipient 
government. Given the different motivations for giving DAH, country offices may be 
forced to follow the ‘official line’, even if that means bypassing mechanisms of country 
ownership, harmonization and alignment. Long project cycles and short-term posts in 
donor offices have also been blamed for hindering accountability (Monkam 2008a).  
 
Lack of trust in recipients’ accountability mechanisms has resulted in donors either 
setting up parallel systems, which further undermine the government (Buse 1999), 
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attaching conditions on how assistance is managed and accounted for, which limits its 
predictability and country ownership, or attempting to improve governments’ systems 
through technical assistance, which has been blamed for wasting resources on 
international consultants or luring government employees away from their jobs for 
training purposes with per diems or salary top-ups (Mueller et al. 2011). 
 
Recipient governments and those implementing DAH funded services may not be fully 
accountable to their beneficiaries due to a phenomenon known as the ‘broken feedback 
loop’, whereby the people paying for the services are different to those receiving them 
(Easterly 2008). This is slowly changing, however, largely due to the advocacy efforts 
of increasingly stronger CSOs, both in donor and recipient countries. 
 
Accountability is also hindered by power inequality between donors and recipients 
(Eyben 2006), as donors have control over resources, and can withdraw them at any 
point if they feel the recipient governments are not adhering to the conditions attached 
to the DAH (Ebrahim 2003). In contrast, there is no mechanism for sanctioning donors 
if they default on their commitments (Eyben 2006). Having said this, donors also face 
the Samaritan’s dilemma, which arises when the cost of enforcing conditionality (i.e. 
withdrawing DAH) is higher than the cost of the conditions not being met (Gibson et al. 
2005). 
5 Scalability of aid-supported health care programmes 
The aid influx into some countries, particularly to African and some of smaller South 
East Asian countries has increased the overall public expenditure on health 
dramatically. Consequently, scaling up of public activities around health has been 
observed for many of these countries. 
 
However, several barriers, both financial and non financial, have been encountered 
when trying to scale up aid-funded health programmes (Hanson et al. 2003). A review 
by Mangham and Hanson (2010) highlighted absorption capacity and health system 
needs as key constraints to scaling up health interventions. Concerns regarding 
absorption capacity arise due to micro- and macro-economic constraints countries face 
in using additional aid resources effectively. There are worries regarding the effect 
increased development assistance may have on the partner governments’ ability to plan, 
manage, and budget these resources, and their impact on service delivery (De Renzio 
2005, 2007; International Monetary Fund 2007). There are also concerns about 
diminishing returns of increased aid, although studies have shown that these levels of 
funding have not yet been reached (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2006; Feeny and 
McGillivray 2011). Non-financial barriers to scaling up aid-funded health programmes 
can be encompassed as health system needs. These include the capacity of health 
workers and the appropriate policy and institutional framework that need to be in place 
for additional assistance to be used effectively (Mangham and Hanson 2010). 
 
Two further concerns are quality and equity (Mangham and Hanson 2010). There are 
worries that scaling up health services will decrease the quality of those services, 
particularly if health systems needs for the scale up are not in place. For this to be 
prevented, it is important that additional expenditure on health infrastructure is 
accompanied by increased recurrent spending to support the additional health sector 
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supply. There is some evidence that this is happening, with the Global Fund funding the 
construction of facilities, training health care personnel as well as improving the 
availability of medicines (Yu et al. 2008; Schwartlander et al. 2006). Moreover, there 
may exist a trade off between efficiency and equity when scaling up health programmes. 
This is because it would take more resources to reach the poorest populations, as they 
are often hardest to reach, and therefore scale ups that aim to reach as many people as 
possible may not reach in these populations (Mangham and Hanson 2010). This has 
been found to be the case in two studies evaluating the affordable medicines facility for 
malaria initiative and the evaluation of the ‘3 by 5 Initiative’ by the WHO.3 In both 
cases they found that although the interventions had achieved wider coverage, this 
tended to be focused on the upper quintiles, with the poorer populations still 
experiencing the most acute shortages of medicines (Battistella Nemes et al. 2006; 
Cohen et al. 2010). 
 
Work undertaken by Hanson et al. (2003) identified five levels at which the above 
constraints can operate, and to which interventions to address them should be aimed. 
The first is at the level of the community and household, where the key constraints are 
lack of demand and use of interventions. The second is at the level of health services 
delivery, which includes health systems issues, such as the quantity and quality of 
human resources, availability of drugs and medical supplies, etc. The third level of 
constraints is at the level of health sector policy and strategic management, where 
constraints include lack of adequate policies and incentives and over-reliance on donor 
funding. The final level includes public policies cutting across sectors and 
environmental and contextual characteristics, such as governance and the overall policy 
framework.  
 
Despite all of the above, many examples can be found in the literature of successful 
scale up interventions (see Table 4 for a summary of these). A study of the scale up of 
an adolescent and sexual health programme in Tanzania was reported to achieve high 
coverage. The authors associate the success of the scale up with the structured nature of 
the process. However, they express concerns regarding the quality of the programmes 
and the need for increased supervision (Renju et al. 2011). In a set of case studies 
carried out by Medlin et al. (2006), the authors found that country ownership, strong 
leadership and management, and realistic financing were all associated with effective 
scale up of programmes. Similarly, three case studies conducted as part of the 
commission of macroeconomics and health in Chad, India, and Tanzania highlight the 
importance of addressing demand and supply issues by engaging with the community to 
integrate their needs and perceptions, and managing human resources and health 
infrastructure (Wyss K et al. 2003). They also highlight the need for clear objectives and 
information systems for monitoring progress, strong evidence-based technical design 
and innovative approaches to address constraints at the policy and management level 
(Rao Seshadri 2003), and the importance of sequencing and addressing policy and 
infrastructure constraints, often outside the health ministry (Munishi 2003). 
  
                                                
3 WHO (2009); http://www.who.int/3by5/en/.  
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Table 4: Summary of successful scale-up intervientions 
Title and authors Study summary
Steketee, R. W. and T. P. Eisele 
(2009). ‘Is the scale up of malaria 
intervention coverage also 
achieving equity?’ PLoS One 
4(12): e8409. 
Review of Demographic and Health Surveys, Multiple Indicator 
Cluster Surveys, and Malaria Indicator Surveys in African malaria-
endemic countries in the time period of 2006-2008. The study found 
great variation between levels of coverage of insecticide-treated 
mosquito nets (ITNs), treatment rates and intermittent preventive 
treatment (IPTp). Furthermore, the authors found that 52 per cent of 
the countries studied had an equitable distribution of ITNs, 30 per 
cent of treatment coverage and IPTp in pregnant women was higher 
in urban and richer households. This study shows that equitable scale 
up of malaria programmes is possible, although only two countries 
achieved equity in all three areas, with distribution of mosquito nets 
achieving higher coverage levels. The study found that countries with 
higher coverage did not necessarily achieve higher levels of equity. 
Furthermore, they conclude that two factors are associated with 
higher equity: the policies and delivery strategy, and the quality of 
delivery systems available.  
Wolkon, A., J. L. Vanden Eng, et 
al. (2010). ‘Rapid scale-up of 
long-lasting insecticide-treated 
bed nets through integration into 
the national immunization 
program during child health week 
in Togo 2004’.  Am J Trop Med 
Hyg 83(5): 1014-1019 
This study analyses the coverage of a campaign to scale up 
ownership of ITNs by integrating ITN delivery with the vaccination 
campaign in six regions of Togo. The authors conducted community-
based cross-sectional surveys one and nine months after the 
campaign to assess coverage, equity and use of ITNs. The study 
found that the intervention achieved high levels of coverage and 
equity, even nine months post-campaign. Despite high levels of 
coverage, however, the study found low levels of use of ITNs. The 
authors of this study conclude that integrated campaigns are an 
effective way to scale up coverage, and therefore recommend this 
strategy to other countries. In addition, they reinforce the message 
that distributing ITNs free of cost was key in achieving high coverage. 
Cohen, J. M., O. Sabot, et al. 
(2010). ‘A pharmacy too far? 
Equity and spatial distribution of 
outcomes in the delivery of 
subsidized artemisinin-based 
combination therapies through 
private drug shops’.  BMC Health 
Serv Res 10 Suppl 1: S6. 
This study assesses the effectiveness of a pilot subsidy for 
artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) used for malaria 
treatment in two districts of Tanzania. The study consisted of a 
baseline and four follow up surveys in the form of exit interviews over 
a period of 15 months. The results from the study indicate that 
although sales of ACTs increased substantially, there were significant 
geographical variations with shops closer to towns, main roads and 
accessed by individuals of higher socioeconomic status experiencing 
higher stocking and sales of ACTs. The study concludes that 
additional efforts are needed to achieve equity as this subsidy is 
scaled up across different countries. 
Scott, V. E., M. Chopra, et al. 
(2005). ‘How equitable is the 
scaling up of HIV service 
provision in South Africa?’ S Afr 
Med J 95(2): 109-113. 
This study reports on the findings of a cross-sectional descriptive 
study on the availability and use of HIV programmes, as well as 
management and support structures, in three districts of South Africa. 
The findings from the study reveal inequalities in service delivery 
between the richer, urban site and the poorer rural ones. The study 
concludes that the scale up of HIV services is exacerbating 
inequalities in service delivery and calls for policy makers to take into 
consideration equity issues as these may lower the effectiveness of 
interventions. 
Renju, J. R., A. B. A. Bahati, et al. 
(2011). ‘Scaling up adolescent 
sexual and reproductive health 
interventions through existing 
government systems? A detailed 
process evaluation of a school-
based intervention in Mwanza 
Region in the Northwest of 
Tanzania’.  Journal of Adolescent 
Health 48(1): 79-86 
This study reports on the scale up of a school-based reproductive and 
sexual health programme in Tanzania. The study found that the 10-
fold scale up achieved a high coverage, which the authors attribute to 
the structured nature of the process. However, the authors express 
worries that this may have come at the cost of quality of the 
intervention. The study recommends higher levels of supervision and 
incentives to improve on this. 
Improving the Health of 
Populations: Lessons of 
Experience (Medlin, C. A., M. 
Chowdhury, et al. 2006). 
This series of 17 case studies found that country ownership, strong 
leadership and management, and realistic financing were all 
associated with effective scale up of programmes. 
Wyss K, Moto DD, et al. (2003). 
‘Constraints to scaling up health 
This paper reports on an assessment of the barriers to scaling up 
health interventions in Chad. It highlights the importance of 
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related interventions: the case of 
Chad, Central Africa’.  Journal of 
International Development 15(1): 
87-100. 
addressing demand and supply issues by engaging with the 
community to integrate their needs and perceptions, and managing 
human resources and health infrastructure. 
Rao, S. S. (2003). ‘Constraints to 
scaling up health programmes: a 
comparative study of two Indian 
states’.  Journal of International 
Development 15(1): 101-114. 
This study analyses the constraints phased by two Indian states when 
scaling up health interventions. It finds that in order to be successfully 
scaled up, programmes need clear objectives and information 
systems for monitoring progress, strong evidence-based technical 
design and innovative approaches to address constraints at the policy 
and management level. 
Schneider, H., D. Coetzee, et al. 
(2010). ‘Differences in 
antiretroviral scale up in three 
South African provinces: the role 
of implementation management’.  
BMC Health Serv Res 10 Suppl 
1: S4. 
This study compares the operational and strategic management of 
the antiretroviral therapy (ART) scale up in three provincial 
governments in South Africa, which had achieved different levels of 
coverage. The findings of the study reveal that although similar 
approaches were adopted for chronic disease care amongst the three 
provinces, differences were observed on political and managerial 
leadership, programme design, monitoring and evaluation systems 
and the nature and extent of external support and partnerships. The 
paper concludes by highlighting the importance of the managerial 
process for successful scale up of programmes. 
Abuya, T., A. Amin, et al. (2010). 
‘Importance of strategic 
management in the 
implementation of private 
medicine retailer programmes: 
case studies from three districts 
in Kenya’.  BMC Health Serv Res 
10 Suppl 1: S7 
This paper compares the scale up processes of private medicine 
retailers in three districts in Kenya. It found that technical support and 
sufficient resources were essential for successful scale up, although 
not enough. The paper found that an effective strategy for managing 
relationships and strong and transparent management systems are 
also needed. 
Seymour, J. (2004) Controlling 
tuberculosis in China. Millions 
Saved: Proven Successes in 
Global Health. What Works 
Working Group. M. Kinder. 
Washington, DC, Centre for 
Global Development. 
This study was part of a series of case studies demonstrating 
successful health programmes. It reports on the scale up of 
tuberculosis Direct Observed Treatment services from 0 to 90 per 
cent in five years. The author credits the success of the scale up with 
political commitment and the use of creative incentives. 
Source: authors’ illustration. 
6 Discussion 
This paper has provided a brief history of aid, and of the literature on aid effectiveness. 
In doing so it has highlighted the inherent methodological difficulties found when trying 
to ascertain the impact of aid on development and growth broadly and the health sector 
specifically. The key impediments to effective development assistance for health are 
summarized, including allocation of resources, donor fragmentation, fungibility of 
funding and issues associated with the process of giving aid such as accountability, 
power and information asymmetries. The different aid modalities, their success stories 
and failures are also summarized. In particular, the shift from project aid to programme-
based approaches is discussed, and the implications and constraints of scaling up 
successful projects reviewed.  
 
One thing that has become clear when looking at success stories in economic 
development over the last 50 years, is that the development process required thorough 
diagnosis of local contexts, which was followed up by eclectic policy prescriptions, 
where conflicting theories were at work even within one single country (Rodrik 2010). 
Whilst the overall ‘best practice’ principles endorsed at international fora on aid 
effectiveness are noble and have generally been found to improve the quality of 
development assistance (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 2009), they are very 
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general, often unrealistic and need to be adapted to the local context. In addition, the 
international community has not managed to abide by them, although efforts seem to be 
moving in the right direction. Therefore transferability of ‘best practice’ is hard, 
particularly given that successful projects and programmes tend to be those that adapt 
best to the local circumstances and where there is real ownership by the local partners.  
 
It cannot, however, be denied that low-income countries do share some common 
characteristics, and that opportunities for cross-country learning abound. This does not 
necessarily have to take place by directly trying to replicate success stories, but by 
taking into account what worked under what circumstances. In that sense, new and 
emerging donors engaging in South to South co-operation can provide significantly 
valuable expertise, some of them being aid recipients until recently themselves (or still 
receiving aid). With that in mind, a new form of co-operation, known as triangular co-
operation, has emerged, where traditional donors—belonging to the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD—provide assistance to support southern 
donors’ programmes, given their technical advantage. An example of this is Germany’s 
support for Brazilian HIV programmes across Latin America (Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness 2009). Table 5 shows some further examples of triangular co-operation. 
Table 5: Examples of triangular co-operation in the health sector 
DAC donor Emerging donor Recipient country Project/Programme 
description 
Canada Brazil Haiti Haitian National Vaccination 
Programme strengthening 
Japan Brazil Angola Development of human 
resources for health in Josina 
Machel Hospital  
Japan Brazil Madagascar Child health services 
improvement programme 
UK Brazil Peru HIV control 
US Brazil São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
Malaria control and 
prevention 
Italy Tunisia Niger Training of health workers 
Japan Mexico Nicaragua Integrated management of 
plagues 
Japan Sri Lanka Various African 
countries 
Hospital management 
Source: adapted from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/54/44652734.pdf. 
 
Few studies evaluating aid practices by new and emerging donors can be found in the 
literature. However, so far the evidence indicates that there are no significant 
differences between new and old donors in their distribution and practices, except that 
new donors do not appear to be influenced by the level of corruption of the recipient 
country when making decisions about aid allocation (Dreher et al. 2011). Emerging 
donors have been praised for bringing extra funds, but there are concerns about 
increasing fragmentation, their high levels of tied aid, a lack of engagement in dialogue 
with partner countries and an unwillingness to harmonize with other donors (Working 
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Party on Aid Effectiveness 2009). Other characteristics of non-DAC donors are that 
they provide more flexible assistance, and mainly engage in project assistance and 
technical co-operation (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 2009).  
 
The international community has begun to acknowledge the importance of new donors, 
and of south to south co-operation, and has made efforts to include them into the high-
level fora on aid effectiveness. However, new donors did not adopt the Busan 
Partnership, but agreed to use its commitments and principles as reference for South-
South co-operation on a ‘voluntary basis’ instead. Although many see their engagement 
in the forum as progress, there is clearly some way to go before they are fully 
integrated.  
 
As a last word, worries that the increasing levels of DAH seen over the past ten years 
will not be sustainable have contributed to increased attention to the effectiveness of 
aid. They have also resulted in donors taking a closer look at how they spend their 
finances and more pressure to be accountable to their funders (taxpayer, other donors) to 
show ‘results’. This has lead to an increased emphasis on results and performance-based 
financing. There is also anecdotal evidence that some prominent donors are moving 
away from programme-based approaches, due to frustrations about the lack of progress 
and the increasing need to show results, which are harder to see in modalities such as 
budget support. Given the lack of clear evidence, and the difficulties in establishing 
whether DAH is effective, there is a danger that the international community keeps 
moving to different approaches due to external pressures without stopping to evaluate 
what has worked or failed and why. In addition, the results based agenda is problematic 
given the short window of analysis used. As discussed in Section 2, health as 
development is a long-term process, the results of which may take years to fully show. 
 
In conclusion, the international community is increasingly recognising that aid can only 
play a limited role in the improvement of health, and the principal drivers of progress 
are domestic, including public policies, governance and institutions, education levels 
and the absence of conflict (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 2009). It is therefore 
important to have adequate expectations of how much can be achieved with 
development assistance. 
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